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Beyond Truth and Falsehood
Science and art, two areas that started being separated delib-
erately and consistently on the threshold of modernism, were 
brought closer together again in postmodernism – thanks to the 
humanities and social sciences. However, this growing closeness 
was not a simple reversal of the situation in which the split had 
occurred; the rules were different, the cause was different, and 
the objective was different. The perception of science and the 
arts as areas of different kinds of cultural practice appeared 
prominently in the thinking of Descartes, whose argument in 
Discourse on Method sought to empower science, to turn it 
into a separate area of human activity and to indicate the rules 
according to which scientific, i.e. cognitive, thinking can be dis-
tinguished from artistic, i.e. creative, thinking (Descartes, 1980). 
The negation of the Cartesian paradigm, in turn, coincided with 
a trend in linguistics that began strongly highlighting the fact 
that proposals publicizing the results of someone’s deliberation 
on epistemological procedures can appear in the social sphere, 
but only if they are verbalized first. This observation, however, 
did not translate directly into artistic practice at the time. On 
the contrary, on the eve of the 20th century stronger emphasis 
was put on the idea that knowledge about the world which is 
transferred through a work of art originates from the pre-dis-
cursive, symbolic and archetypal realm referring to a universal 
pre-experience, and therefore might be verified intuitively, either 
individually or collectively (the issue of a work of art’s  acceptance 
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and popularity requires separate consideration that would include 
not just the psychological aspect but also, for example, the achieve-
ments of contemporary memetics). So, 20th-century disputes on 
the value of discursive and non-discursive learning turned their 
attention to language, as an integral part of human culture on 
one hand, and an independent medium governed by autonomous 
norms and rules on the other. Highlighting the fact that in lan-
guage, you can only speak responsibly about linguistic reality, 
shifted the debate on the nature of truth and falsehood strongly 
toward logic, leaving unresolved issues of sensing, feeling, and 
the sufficiency of individual experience. Although those who 
spoke up for the value of the individual and subjective during 
this time included Georg Simmel, his proposals initially did not 
win the approval of academic circles and started being appreci-
ated a little later (Simmel, 2007). The problem of the cognitive 
value of what is subjective and individual remained an intriguing 
mystery. In the late 19th century (1894) Wilhelm Windelband 
tried to systematize the status of procedures used for describing 
individual events from the past or analyzing original products 
(of literature, visual arts, music, intellect). He proposed a divi-
sion into idiographic sciences, i.e. those reporting on the unique, 
and nomothetic sciences, i.e. those determining laws (Windel-
band, 1992). His follower Heinrich Rickert decided it would be 
more appropriate to distinguish between cultural (idiographic) 
and natural (nomothetic) sciences (Rickert, 1921). Windelband 
favored the idea of truth as an absolute value, independent of any 
pragmatic circumstances (Windelband, 2008). Rickert’s stance 
was similar, as he gave truth the status of a value – the main 
object of scientific cognition. Simmel’s proposals, especially his 
concept of “subjective culture,” went beyond those distinctions 
and were not verifiable. Neither were they possible to falsify, i.e. 
undergo procedures popularized by Karl Popper (2019) for the 
purpose of checking “bold hypotheses” without which science 
could not develop. Today we can already see limitations in the 
paradigm of Popper’s falsificationism, especially when we try to 
apply it to the humanities and social sciences. For example, in 
academic psychology there are two methodological “camps” – 
quantitative, relying as much as possible on experiments, statis-
tical analyses and conclusions about hypotheses, and qualitative, 
aiming to learn about the subjective perspective of the individual 
being studied.
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A subjective “sense of truth,” although based on acknowl-
edging truth’s objective value, hands the power of judgment 
to the acting subject. However, some doubt still remains as to 
the possibility of properly exercising that power in a situation 
when the judgments themselves are expressed in language. Of 
course the material of language allows true and false sentences 
– in the logical sense – to be uttered, but it does not fulfill the 
requirement of absolutely true statements about the non-linguistic 
reality. This dilemma was already noticed earlier, and led to the 
validation of various approximation procedures, among which 
granting special status to metaphors came to the forefront. At 
the end of the 18th century this was a new idea, but with time, 
metaphorical language made its way into science and gradually 
became an independent medium, with a life of its own, generat-
ing its own problems. Among the most important consequences 
of uncovering the connection between science and the choice of 
linguistic procedures for the transfer of research results in both 
the humanities and the natural sciences, we should mention the 
“narratological turn” that allowed practically any scientific state-
ment to be considered in terms of a linguistic statement, in terms 
of a kind of “story” about a specific case or set of cases; this 
could be a monophonic story or one being part of a polyphony. 
Thus, we can approach the scientific statements of a given time 
in the same way Mikhail Bakhtin (1970) approached the novels 
of Dostoyevsky. These novels do not represent a single, overrid-
ing vision of the author, but are the result of dialogues between 
independent individuals and their points of view or ideologies. 
Therefore, we can say after Bakhtin that truth is not born in 
one person’s mind but comes into being between people seeking 
it together; it is born in a process of dialogue that inevitably is 
entangled in linguistic conventions.
Thus, today we can recognize that fields situated on the 
boundary between science and the arts include, for example, 
psychology’s Dialogical Self Theory, which posits that human 
personality is composed of a number of internal voices repre-
senting different social roles, aspects or traits of a person. These 
voices are constantly in dialogue with one another, trying to 
reduce tensions and resolve contradictions, make decisions and 
lend meanings. Underlining the subjective nature of experience, 
Dialogical Self Theory says that human personality is unavoida-
bly shaped by cultural and civilizational conditions, which today 
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are also shifting away from objective, timeless facts and values 
toward more individualized “truths.”1
The question of truth and falsehood in science and art has thus 
assumed a new dimension in our times: For some in our commu-
nity, the classic understanding of truth, positivist in spirit, is still 
the main reference point in judging phenomena and processes; 
for others, a guarantee of scientific character, also in scientific 
analyses of art, lies in concentrating our research attention on 
the interpretation of narrative procedures. This means one rel-
evant question is that of what truth is in relation to the human 
individual. Invoking Dilthey’s distinction (Dilthey, 1982, 2005), 
we would need to resolve whether sufficiently explaining human 
anatomy, physiology and neurobiology will bring the same effect 
as understanding a person’s individual experience.
The collection of analyses and interpretations presented in 
this volume seems to testify to an ongoing intensive search for 
an answer on how the problem of truth and falsehood in sci-
ence and the arts should be investigated today. The individual 
proposals are mostly “case studies,” pointing to the opposition 
from the title or one of its elements in the context of specific 
phenomena and events. However, some of the authors offer more 
synthetic summaries of progressively growing knowledge on the 
significance of nuances in distinguishing between what is true, 
probable, real, natural, authentic, reliable or clear, and what is 
untrue, false, fake, pretend, inauthentic, stylized, ironic, illusory, 
deceitful, erroneous, mistaken, incorrect, unreliable or wrong. The 
richness of synonyms in language does not so much make it easier 
to support relativism in relation to Truth as it indicates that social 
experience and the truth of language demands that we exercise 
great caution when expressing absolute value judgments. Today 
those positivist hopes for the discovery of objective facts have 
1 The concept of possible worlds is quite a good illustration of individualized 
truths. Umberto Eco in Lector in fabula (1994, p. 190) writes that the characters 
within a narrated world assume propositional attitudes. For example, Little Red 
Riding Hood thinks the character in the bed is her grandmother (whereas, for 
the reader’s benefit, the plot has negated the girl’s belief). What the girl believes 
is her own b e l i e f  structure, but it also remains one of the states of the fabula. 
In this way, the fabula proposes two states of affairs: one in which it is the wolf 
lying in the bed, and another in which the bed’s occupant is the grandmother. 
We know straight away (but the girl is not aware of it until the end of the story) 
that one of these states is presented as being true and the other as untrue.
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largely died down. Instead, the relativity of knowledge is being 
underlined more and more often. The replies we obtain depend to 
a large extent on the questions asked, and the act of observation 
inevitably turns the observer into an element of the whole system.
Presenting the specific proposals of our authors, we need to 
warn readers that this is a special collection: It is the outcome 
of a conference organized for the conclusion of the 10-year 
Inter-University Program of Interdisciplinary PhD Studies at 
the »Artes Liberales« Academy. It was attended by the academic 
teachers, who have supervised some excellent doctoral disser-
tations, and the program’s students themselves, most of whom 
now hold doctoral and postdoctoral degrees. The program was 
headed by Professor Barbara Bokus, and it was also she who 
proposed a few years ago that “Master Seminars” be added to 
the program. The seminar for the program’s jubilee, and for its 
closing in the present format, was chaired by Professor Jerzy 
Axer and preceded the conference, an outline of whose subject 
matter will follow.
Jerzy Axer gave his talk in the form of a biographical story. 
This enabled him to give an accessible presentation of complicated 
problems connected with the development of scientific rules of 
editing Classical texts. The liminal experience of confronting the 
rigid foundations of positivist methodology with new reception 
theories and narratological concepts led the Professor to pose 
the fundamental question of the scientific credibility and veracity 
of the products of interpretation as it starts moving dangerously 
close to the border of falsity. Axer’s erudite argumentation is 
rounded off with the following conclusion: “Ars critica consi s ts 
of scientific activity, artistic work and an exercise in forgery 
of old masters, all rolled into one. Perhaps that is what makes 
it so fascinating and allows it to bring so many triumphs and 
disappointments, depending on the temperament, character and 
mood of whoever is practicing it.”
Contemporary ars critica is sometimes helpless, however, when 
faced with the need to authenticate a miraculously discovered 
document from the past. This is the case recounted by Prze-
mysław Piwowarczyk, whose attention was drawn to a media 
storm, almost self-inflicted by the Harvard Divinity School, on 
the threshold of the 21st century. Karen King, a member of the 
staff, was offered a manuscript that she called the Gospel of Jesus’ 
Wife. The author recounts the problems with confirming the find’s 
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authenticity almost as a crime story. However, the scientific value 
of his thoughts on the veracity of newly discovered artifacts, and 
on the capabilities of modern-day scientific methods of verifying 
unexpected finds, is of unquestionable importance. 
The focus of Karol Wilczyński’s interest is the output of 
Al-Ġazālī, an Arab thinker from the turn of the 12th and 13th 
centuries, an opponent of falsafa, a philosophy that first became 
popular more than a century before he was born and lasted almost 
four hundred years. Al-Ġazālī saw falsafa as a dangerous movement, 
potentially breaking with Islam, abandoning religious practices, 
trusting in reason and, as a result, erring to an extent making 
it impossible to find truth and salvation. “Pride connected with 
wrongful practice and knowledge unaware of its own limitations 
ultimately leads to unbelief,” and “the philosophers’ undoing is 
their pride and their belief that science alone can be enough for 
their salvation and happiness.” Excessive trust in the power of 
the mind leads people astray and away from all that is important 
and true. Presenting his own interpretation of selected views 
of Al-Ġazālī, the author draws our attention to the renaissance 
of  interest in his ideas currently observed in Arab countries.
On the example of the theory of poetic art of Maciej Sar-
biewski (1595–1640), a Polish Jesuit, Maria Łukaszewicz-Chantry 
considers the gap between assumed proof of truth when a fact 
is documented by a record, and poetry which expresses truth 
indirectly, employs metaphors and allegories, often constructs 
nonexistent beings, to use them as examples pointing to the 
existence of phenomena and regularities that go unnoticed in 
the process of direct perception.
Izabella Zatorska traces the relations between illusion and 
truth in theater from the Baroque to the Romantic period, set-
ting out to show how Baroque and Rococo theater influenced 
the behavior of the elites and to what extent those elites were 
aware of the social consequences of intentional theatralization 
of life. Those consequences were definitely noticed by some 
writers, who proposed a secondary theatralization of the scene: 
“turning the game of illusion into the subject; this is a method 
allowing the truth to be sought – over and above the immediacy 
of the masquerade.” This kind of transformation, effected in the 
time of neoclassicism and then Romanticism, did not eradicate the 
theatralization of life as such, but fundamentally changed its forms 
and scope. What remained, however, was the problem – important 
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in both life and theater – of lying as intentional misleading and 
speaking untruths, and illusion creating appearances thanks to 
which truth could be revealed.
Wojciech Sajkowski draws our attention to 18th- and 19th-cen-
tury French-language descriptions of the Morlachs. The authors 
of the accounts he has chosen quite unanimously judged that 
“the Southern Slavs who inhabit provincial Dalmatia are simple, 
naturally good and sincere.” The author links the convention of 
these narratives with a peculiar valorization of truth. This emerged 
in the 17th century as a result of contacts between educated, or 
at least literate, residents of Western Europe with “uncivilized” 
peoples. Among those considered uncivilized were Slavic shep-
herds, whose “confidence, devotion and sincerity are linked to 
an inability to understand abstractions and sophisticated truths 
of the civilized world.” The opposition of civilized versus unciv-
ilized, disseminated by Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon, found 
confirmation in the observations of travelers of the time. The 
writers who penned the accounts under consideration, theoreti-
cally respecting the idea of natural law, noted that in the world 
of civilization “yes” does not always mean “yes” and “no” does 
not always mean “no.” In contact with that world, “people of 
nature” acting artlessly fall victim to their own naivety. Thus, 
the Slavs’ honesty becomes a sign of their uncivilized character.
Adam Grzeliński points out that “classical philosophical aes-
thetics … developed several solutions to the problem of justifying 
the validity of aesthetic judgments.” The main authors of such 
solutions in British aesthetics were Anthony Ashley Cooper Shaft-
esbury, Edmund Burke, and David Hume. Their achievements 
were synthesized in Immanuel Kant’s concept of reducing the 
phenomenon of beauty to its simplest form and according aes-
thetic judgements the value of universality and validity. Grzeliński 
focuses on presenting the views of George Santayana (1863–1952), 
who offered a critique of 18th-century philosophers’ efforts to 
establish conditions for the validity of judgements of taste; in 
this, he sets out to show that these seemingly polemical stances 
can be reconciled to some extent.
Anna Żymełka-Pietrzak highlights the significance of ideas 
put forward by Johann Georg Hamann, who was one of the 
first to negate systematic philosophy and saw the very notion 
of a system as “a hindrance to truth.” That is why this thinker 
from Königsberg gave up the precise language typical of rational 
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discourse in favor of metaphorical disquisition introducing people 
to the essence of things in a way making it more easily com-
prehensible. The actual process of getting to the truth hidden 
amidst a tangle of symbols and metaphors was to be illustrated 
by Lichtwer’s story of the many dresses of the woman-fable 
attacked by robbers. Stripped of her clothing, the naked fable, 
like the naked truth, is something “no one can bear to look at.” 
But in Hamann’s interpretation, the secret of truth is that it is 
bodiless, and thus removing successive layers of clothing can be 
a fascinating road to learning, but arriving at the goal thwarts 
the purpose, for there is only one Truth, and it is connected to 
divine reality inaccessible to humans. This nature of truth means 
we can only speak of it indirectly, through metaphorical language 
that has a necessary presence in philosophy.
In her paper “Worthless yet priceless: The truths and eco-
nomics of poetry” Marta Baron-Milian discusses the truth of 
a poetic text not so much in opposition to falsehood, but rather 
in the context of knowledge to be extracted indirectly. The 
semantic potential of a poetic message and its unobvious charac-
ter as a source of new meanings was not an evident value on the 
threshold of modernity. Contrary to Johann Wolfgang Goethe, 
who demanded the right to view the world through imagination 
(and not just scientific knowledge), Jeremy Bentham, for example, 
thought that “all poetry is misrepresentation,” that it is not true 
to reality and is not useful. Tracing the discourse surrounding the 
worth of what is not useful and the truth of what is impossible 
to verify using scientific tools, the author succeeds in convincing 
her readers that there are multiple dimensions involved in the 
useful, and there is enormous cognitive value in the ambiguous.
The concept of reflection has played an important role in the 
quest for truth, whether in science or in the arts. Paweł Tom-
czok is interested in cognition and experience, which respectively 
belong to the realms of learning and aesthetics, in relation to the 
metaphor of mirroring, and also in “different forms of mirroring 
– above all in art and philosophy.” He points to the fact that the 
metaphor of mirroring “quickly got ensnared in linguistic rep-
resentation – it was words and sentences, notions and judgments 
that were meant to reflect reality,” and then mirrors themselves 
became “historical mediators that take part in a complicated 
network made up of people and things.” Therefore, they can 
be seen as nodes in a network “combining theory and practice, 
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science and aesthetics, technology and speculation.” Highlighting 
the paradigmatic potential of mirroring, the author does not lose 
sight of the metaphor of words reflecting reality and the problem 
of truth this leads to.
In his paper on truth and probability in studies on religious 
thought, Michał Rogalski considers the logical consequences of 
a historian of philosophy assuming the position of a disengaged, 
objective, unbiased researcher. Such a tradition, originating from 
19th-century German thought, reveals its inadequacy as soon as 
controversial issues come into play, when describing them requires 
showing “their mutual relationships and the argumentation net-
works forming as a result of their coexistence.” It is hard to stay 
impartial when you have to judge the cohesion of someone else’s 
argumentation involved in a dispute and being modified as the 
dispute progresses. Rogalski considers this theoretical problem 
on the example of the debate on Catholic modernism that took 
place in the last decade of the 19th century and in the early 20th 
century. “However, when this kind of description is used, ques-
tions inevitably need to be asked about the truth or probability 
of hypotheses, arguments, or entire argumentation strategies. 
Neither the category of truth nor the category of probability 
can be eliminated when using value judgments.” Therefore, the 
author wonders how we are “to work with” these categories.
Juxtaposing “Hannah Arendt’s Marranic evasions and the truth 
of her cryptotheology,” Rafał Zawisza successfully points us to 
such an interpretation of the Gospel by Arendt, as an expert on the 
writings of Augustine of Hippo, that would allow for the simul-
taneous use of the hermeneutic tradition of Jews and Christians 
for explaining at least some of the mysteries of human existence. 
Thus, he accents the importance of natality as a counterbalance to 
mortality, and also the beginning of any human action, as well as 
extracting the idea that “labor, work, and action are ‘intimately 
connected’ with birth and death.” Natality, Zawisza tells us, lies 
at the foundation of “the cryptotheology of singularity.” This 
cryptotheology enabled Arendt to offer her distinctive reinter-
pretation of the message on the birth of Jesus. By highlighting 
Arendt’s peculiar flirtation with two theological traditions in 
her oeuvre, the paper’s author reveals a new dimension of truth 
hidden beneath that which is seemingly “sloppy” and imprecise.
Piotr Kałowski considers the problem from the volume’s title 
in the context of the achievements of contemporary psychology. 
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First confirming the importance of psychotherapy, the author 
also points out that the reasons it is effective are not fully clear. 
Hence, he investigates how the notions of truth and falsehood 
apply to a situation when we know how a sequence of causes 
and effects proceeds, but we do not know why. With the help 
of methodological tools developed by narrative medicine, he 
indicates the importance of changes that occur during therapy 
in an area defined by a patient’s narrative that is the result of 
reconciling many internal dialogues. The previously undisputed 
credibility of such a narrative can sometimes be traumatic, and 
its reorganization under the guidance of the right therapist, i.e. 
one who guarantees a safe relationship, can bring positive effects. 
This method, inspired by postmodernist ideas, could – accord-
ing to the author – effectively support the much more popular 
cognitive behavioral therapy which, however, was developed in 
different historical circumstances.
Anna Milanowicz offers some thoughts on the relationship 
between truth and untruth in irony. From a psycholinguistic 
viewpoint, the author characterizes the intention behind ironic 
messages, seeing irony as the result of a certain type of social 
experience. The essay invokes the Socratic tradition related to 
cognition and the source of “storytelling” (building stories and 
relationships with the audience) in dramatic irony. The theory of 
Negation of Expectations in Irony (NEI) is proposed. The rela-
tionship between “ironic” untruth and lies is outlined. Finally, 
the ambiguity of “ironic” meanings is described from the per-
spective of gender binary stereotypes.
Adrianna Smurzyńska discusses a problem familiar to cognitiv-
ists, namely mentalization, or attributing mental states to others. 
The source of this competence has yet to be fully explained. The 
author focuses on simulation theory, which assumes that you can 
get to know others by simulating their mental states. This process 
can take place automatically and unthinkingly (intuitively), or 
“on a reflexive level” when one tries to put oneself in another’s 
shoes. In this theory, “our own mind is treated as a tool which 
enables us to take another person’s perspective.” Identifying 
the mental states of others is only possible, however, when the 
person doing this does not have any mental disorders, since the 
“abilities to differentiate perspectives and separate one’s own 
and others’ mental states seem to be necessary conditions for 
adequate mentalization. The capability to simulate others’ mental 
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states – to put oneself in someone else’s shoes – is important but 
at the same time not sufficient.”
Joanna Barska draws our attention to music as illustration, 
tracing this phenomenon from the Renaissance when music was 
ideologically subordinated to text and the principle of decorum. 
With time, composers developed a set of rhetorical-musical figures 
that were meant to signal specific content. On the other hand, 
“the 17th- and early 18th-century belief that the main purpose 
of music is to arouse passions and affects yielded the  theory 
of affects that had an especially strong presence in the Ger-
man-speaking world.” This trend in music developing from the 
Renaissance aimed to evoke natural sounds and mental states 
as faithfully as possible with the use of means at the disposal of 
musicians in a given period.
Truth in music is also a matter of interest to Karolina 
Kolinek-Siechowicz, who focuses on historically informed per-
formance. She convincingly argues not only that a present-day 
musician cannot credibly recreate the genuine sound of historical 
instruments or the way a given piece was performed, but also 
that neither today’s performers nor today’s audiences can break 
free of the constraints of their own culture and its aesthetic 
expectations.
Another aspect of truth in music is presented in the paper by 
Anna Chęćka. The author suggests two ways of pursuing such 
truth: in one, we consider the truth of a music score, while the 
other seeks “truth of performance,” i.e. authenticity within per-
formance practice. Analyzing the phenomenon of pianist Yuja 
Wang and her fictional persona Mei Jin from the novel Chinese 
Piano, the author points to some of the problems arising when 
we judge the credibility of a performance that goes beyond the 
standards accepted in a given period.
Meanwhile, Piotr Słodkowski is interested in the relationship 
between the truth of a painting when considered in intertextual 
relations with other pictorial representations, and the “truth of 
the matter” of a specific painting. From theoretical reflection on 
this distinction, the author extracts two extreme attitudes: “To 
Heidegger, the truth revealed in painting is the truth of things 
(aletheia), to Schapiro – a faithful representation referring to an 
object (mimesis).” But it was Derrida who believed that the idea 
that paintings “only refer us to other paintings was decisive for 
the deconstruction of the metaphysics of presence.” The paper’s 
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author, apparently more fascinated by Bjørnar Olsen’s question of 
how things remember, looks at the work of Polish-Jewish mod-
ernist Henryk Streng and American pop-art precursor Robert 
Rauschenberg in order to show that “the truth of a painting as 
the truth of matter has the irreducible value of a historical source 
which – specifically – testifies to very different albeit important 
existential experiences.”
Maciej Junkiert looks into the problem of confronting the 
Romantic model of literary history with the demands of contem-
porary times. He offers the hypothesis that the Polish model of 
the history of literature, which sometimes more and sometimes 
less consciously invokes fundamental texts of German philoso-
phy from the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries, links history 
education to the idea of building/preserving national identity. 
Hence, national history of literature is a kind of site of memory 
protecting the self-knowledge of a group in danger of losing its 
social and intellectual ties to the past. The truth of the past 
affecting the truth of the present and the development of the 
future lay at the foundation of the paradigm in which the history 
of literature was shaped two hundred years ago; although that 
paradigm is not falsified today, its value is no longer appreci-
ated. Developing a new paradigm is a challenge for present-day 
philology.
Finally, Jan Kutnik draws attention to the problem of the 
truth of museum exhibitions commemorating real places of tor-
ture and killing from World War II. A confrontation of visitors’ 
expectations with the effects of the work of exhibition designers 
(studies conducted in 2016–2019) reveals different ways of under-
standing the veracity of testimonies of the war and the Holocaust. 
The author shows how changing history-based politics affected 
the exhibition concepts pursued by the Museum at Majdanek, 
points to a need to stick to historical truth, and underlines the 
educational value of similar museums.
The great majority of the authors discussing truth and false-
hood in science and art in the present volume assign truth the 
status of an irreducible point of reference both in striving for 
elementary knowledge about the world and in seeking methods 
and artistic means of achieving this goal. The multilevel and 
multiple-aspect research presented here, conducted on material 
from different periods and different cultures, shows very clearly 
that truth and falsehood lie at the foundation of all human 
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motivation, choices, decisions, and behaviors. At the same time, 
however, it reveals that every bid to extrapolate the results of 
detailed studies into generalizations aimed at universalization – by 
the very fact of their discursivation – either subjects the discus-
sion to the rules of formal logic or situates it outside the realm 
of truth and falsehood.
* * *
This e-book is the English version of the monograph pub-
lished in Polish as Prawda i fałsz w nauce i sztuce, edited by Ewa 
Kosowska and Barbara Bokus. Both volumes have been published 
simultaneously by Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego. 
We are grateful to the monograph’s reviewers – Professor Stefan 
Bednarek and Professor Stanisław Rabiej – for their kind remarks 
and suggestions. A sincere thank you to Joanna Dutkiewicz for 
her diligent proofreading of this volume. 
Warsaw, Katowice
September 2019 The Editors
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